Casinos In Las Vegas

FN3. 326 U.S. 501, 506, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946).

FN4. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).

FN5. Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69 n. 32, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (plurality opinion)).

Commercial speech may be suppressed even where, as here, it is conducted in a traditional public forum. [FN6] In determining whether suppression of commercial speech passes First Amendment muster, courts apply "intermediate" scrutiny, analyzing government regulations under the four-part test announced in Central Hudson: [FN7]

FN6. See Metromedia; Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993).

FN7. 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.

At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.