Mirage Hotel

The district court judge allowed the parties to submit additional briefs and took the matter under advisement. On June 30, 1999, the district court granted Mirage's request for a temporary injunction. In an oral hearing on the motion, the district court judge indicated that he did not think S.O.C./ Hillsboro's arguments regarding the First Amendment were persuasive and that the Mirage was entitled to protect its private property by seeking to exclude commercial handbillers. The preliminary injunction was filed on July 8, 1999. S.O.C./ Hillsboro made a timely appeal to this court on July 22, 1999.

DISCUSSION The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent abuse. [FN4] This court's review is limited to the record to determine whether the lower court exceeded the permissible bounds of discretion. [FN5] A district court's determinations of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. [FN6] If the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they will be upheld. [FN7] Questions of law are reviewed de novo. [FN8]

FN4. See Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 138, 978 P.2d 311, 319 (1999).

FN5. Id.

FN6. Hermann Trust v. Varco-Pruden Buildings, 106 Nev. 564, 566, 796 P.2d 590, 591-92 (1990).

FN7. Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships, 110 Nev. 23, 25, 866 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1994).